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I. INTRODUCTION
Today, most patent practitioners would likely agree that it is much
more difficult to determine obviousness than anticipation of an invention.
Because obviousness is based on a more subjective analysis of the
invention and the prior art, disputes about obviousness frequently arise. As
a result, a rich body of case law has developed, replete with nuances and
subtleties that make the obviousness analysis one of the most problematic
issues in the field.
The objective of this article is to provide assistance to patent attorneys
and agents who regularly deal with this issue by arming them with tools to
disqualify a prior art reference that might otherwise be used to render an
invention obvious. Specifically, using these tools, a potentially problematic
reference can be excluded from the obviousness analysis if it is not within
the so-called analogous art.
II. OBVIOUSNESS

Under the federal obviousness statute, an invention is unpatentable "if
the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the
prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been
obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary
skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains."' Questions of the
obviousness of an invention can arise during patent examination,
reexamination, and litigation. During patent examination or reexamination,
a patent examiner seeks prior art to prove an invention is obvious. During
litigation, an accused infringer of a patent similarly seeks prior art that
would prove that the previously issued patent is invalid because it was
obvious.
A determination of obviousness is a legal conclusion based on a series
of underlying factual inquiries. 2 The three main underlying questions of
fact, laid out by the Supreme Court in Graham v. John Deere Co., are (1)
the scope and content of the prior art; (2) the differences between the prior
art and the claims at issue; and (3) the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent
art. 3 Secondary considerations, or objective facts that may indicate nonobviousness of the invention, include things such as its commercial success,
its satisfaction of a long-felt but unsolved need, the failure of others
attempting to solve the same problem, 4 skepticism of experts as to whether
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006).
2 Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 810 F.2d 1561, 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
3 Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966).
4 Id.
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the completed invention would work,6 5 and copying of the invention by
others in preference over the prior art.
That these determinations are questions of fact leads to significant
implications. For example, during patent litigation, a genuine dispute as to7
any of these factual inquiries prevents a summary judgment of invalidity.
Further, on an appeal of a rejection of a patent application, or an appeal of a
finding of obviousness during litigation, these issues are reviewed under the8
"clearly erroneous" standard of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Thus, it is important to get the answer right the first time.
III. SCOPE OF THE PRIOR ART
This article is generally limited to the first factual inquiry into the
scope and content of the prior art. In fact, the scope of the prior art and its
content are really two distinct inquiries: the scope refers to what references
qualify and the content refers to what those qualifying references actually
say. More specifically, then, this article is limited to the scope of the9 prior
art, determined by the so-called analogous (or non-analogous) art test.
The terminology used in different opinions can be inconsistent and
may be a cause of confusion. Some opinions indicate that if a cited
reference is non-analogous, it is not called "prior art." 10 Other opinions
indicate that a non-analogous reference may still be called "prior art," but
that it is not relevant in determining obviousness. II
Regardless of the terminology used, if a non-analogous reference is
considered to be outside the prior art, or if it is considered to be within the
prior art but not relevant to determining obviousness, the result is the same:
the reference goes away. It cannot be used to support a determination of
obviousness. Thus, for consistency in this article, a non-analogous reference
will be referred to as being outside the scope of the prior art. However, the

5 See United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39, 52 (1966).
6 See Diamond Rubber Co. v. Consol. Rubber Tire Co., 220 U.S. 428, 441 (1911).
7 State Contracting & Eng'g Corp. v. Condotte Am., Inc., 346 F.3d 1057, 1069-70
(Fed. Cir. 2003) (reversing a summary judgment of obviousness because there was a genuine
factual dispute as to, among other things, whether a cited reference was within the scope of
the prior art).
8 FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a). See e.g., Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 810 F.2d 1561,
1565-69 (Fed. Cir. 1987) ("If findings necessary to support a legal conclusion are clearly
erroneous, the conclusion cannot stand.").
9 See In re Icon Health & Fitness, Inc., 496 F.3d 1374, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
10 In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ("References... qualify as prior art
for an obviousness determination only when analogous to the claimed invention.").
I I E.g., In re Clay, 966 F.2d 656, 658 (Fed. Cir. 1992) ("Whether a reference in the prior
art is 'analogous' is a fact question.").
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reader is advised that depending on the audience or context of an argument
made on this point, it may be advantageous to refer to a purportedly nonanalogous reference as a prior art reference that is irrelevant or not
reasonably pertinent to the question of obviousness.
As a side note, even if a reference is within the scope of the prior art,
the factual inquiry continues to the other Graham questions, so this inquiry
12
is only the beginning of a complete analysis of obviousness.
IV. 35 U.S.C. § 102 AND THE PRIOR ART
Unlike § 102, which fairly clearly and explicitly defines what the prior
art is, § 103 unfortunately lacks any definition of what qualifies, simply
referring to "the prior art." The comments to the 1952 Patent Act, which
first codified the requirement of non-obviousness into 35 U.S.C. § 103,
indicate that "the prior art" of § 102 is the "antecedent [basis]" for the term
as used in § 103.13 Thus, in general, a reference that does not fall into any
statutory category under § 102 can be excluded from an obviousness
analysis. 14 For this reason, unless otherwise noted, this paper will assume
that the so-called "prior art" reference in question falls within the scope of
at least one part of§ 102.
It may initially appear that every reference or other subject matter that
is prior art under § 102 is automatically available for an obviousness
analysis under § 103. In fact, the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure
("MPEP") explicitly states that all prior art that would be available under §
102 is automatically available under § 103.15 Is this statement accurate?
Are all § 102 references available to invalidate patents or patent
applications under § 103, or are there exceptions?
The courts have rejected one potential exception. Under the plain
language of § 103, it appears that the inquiry should be whether the

12 See, e.g., In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 987 (Fed. Cir. 2006) ("[Tlhis test begins the
inquiry into whether a skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine references by
defining the prior art relevant for the obviousness determination[.]").
13 See Exparte Andresen, 212 U.S.P.Q. 100, 101-02 (B.P.A.I. 1976) ("From the above
quoted commentary and the committee report quoted, it appears to us that the commentator
and the committee viewed section 103 as including all of the various bars to a patent as set
forth in section 102.").
14 Note that the converse does not apply: non-analogous art, even from the most distant
field imaginable, can still anticipate an invention as long as it falls within a § 102 category.
See In re Schreiber, 128 F.3d 1473, 1478 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
15 See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE

§ 2141.01(l) (2008), available at http://www.uspto.gov/webloffices/pac/mpep/mpep.htm
[hereinafter M.P.E.P.] (The subsection is entitled: "PRIOR ART AVAILABLE UNDER 35
U.S.C. 102 IS AVAILABLE UNDER 35 U.S.C. 103.").
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invention would have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the
art ("PHOSITA") at the time the invention was made. Thus, this would
seem to except a § 102(b) "statutory bar" reference if it was published more
than a year before the application for patent, yet after the time the invention
was conceived and reduced to practice. Obviously in this scenario, because
such a reference was not published and potentially was not even written
when the invention was made, it could not have rendered an invention
obvious to a PHOSITA trying to solve the problem with which the inventor
was concerned. However, contrary to the plain language of the statute, the
courts do not except such § 102(b) references because such an exception
would be "contrary to the policy consideration which motivated the
enactment by Congress of a statutory bar." 6 Thus, evidently, a
determination of obviousness in this situation must be performed by
imagining a PHOSITA who somehow had access to a publication before it
was published-and potentially before it was even written. 17
Fortunately, however, the patent statutes do create some exceptions to
the general rule. For example, § 103(b) and (c) exclude certain prior art
references for biotechnology inventions and some otherwise obvious
inventions that were created under a joint research agreement with the
inventors of the prior art reference.
Most importantly, though, judicially created exceptions substantially
narrow the scope of the prior art from that available for a § 102 rejection. A
reference is excluded from an obviousness analysis if it is not within an
analogous art to that of the invention.1 8 Analogous arts might generally be
defined as those areas within which a PHOSITA seeking to solve the same
problem with which the inventor was concerned would be inclined to
research for a solution. 19 This exclusion of non-analogous arts is based on a
sense of fairness to inventors, as it is rather unreasonable to presume
knowledge of every reference in every field. 20 However, it is proper to
assume that a PHOSITA, faced with a particular problem, would have

16 In re Foster, 343 F.2d 980, 988 (C.C.P.A. 1965).
17 See Hazeltine Research, Inc. v. Ladd, 226 F. Supp. 459 (D.D.C. 1964), afJ'd,340 F.2d
786 (D.C. Cir. 1964), affd, 382 U.S. 252 (1965) (holding that § 102(e) prior art is also
available for an obviousness analysis).
18 See, e.g., In re Clay, 966 F.2d 656, 658 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (a leading case on the issue
of analogous arts).
19 E.g., In re Shapleigh, 248 F.2d 96, 102 (C.C.P.A. 1957).
20 See In re Wood, 599 F.2d 1032, 1036 (C.C.P.A. 1979) ("[A]ttempt[s] to more closely
approximate the reality of the circumstances surrounding the making of an invention by only
presuming knowledge by the inventor of prior art in the field of his endeavor and in
analogous arts."). The presumption of knowledge is actually attributed to the PHOSITA, not
the inventor. Id
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looked to the arts analogous to that particular problem in order to see if
someone else had already solved that problem.
V. KSR IMPLICATIONS
An argument that a reference is not within the scope of the prior art
must be made carefully after the recent decision ofKSR InternationalCo. v.
Teleflex Inc.2 1 In KSR, the Supreme Court overruled longstanding
precedent in the Federal Circuit related to a rigid application of the oftencited "teaching-suggestion-motivation" (TSM) test used to determine
whether the teachings of prior art references may be combined to render an
invention obvious. 22 However, in light of a recent published opinion, it
appears that at least the Federal Circuit believes that the analogous art test,
used to determine the scope of the prior art, was not substantially affected
by KSR.

23

The difficulty arises because many pre-KSR opinions closely
intermingle their discussions of whether a reference is analogous and
whether there is a teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine cited
references. In fact, this appears to have caused some skilled practitioners to
fail to realize that these are distinct issues; even the MPEP confuses the two
issues in its discussion of analogous and non-analogous art, quoting a
passage from KSR related to combining references to support its statement
of a rule on analogous art.24 Thus, an argument in this area must be clear
that it is attempting to disqualify a reference as outside the scope of the
prior art. Plus, case law supporting the argument must be carefully
reviewed to ensure that quoted passages are not part of a TSM analysis
(pre-KSR) or reason to combine sources (post-KSR).
VI.

WHY IS IT IMPORTANT?

If a reference is within the scope of the prior art, the inventor is
charged with the knowledge and teachings of that reference. 25 More
precisely, the imaginary PHOSITA who hypothetically was confronted with
the same problem as the inventor at the time of invention is deemed to
21 KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007).
22 Id.
23 See In re Icon Health & Fitness, Inc., 496 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
24 M.P.E.P., supra note 15, § 2141.01(a)(1) ("Under the correct analysis, any need or
problem known in the field of endeavor at the time of the invention and addressed by the

patent [or application at issue] can provide a reason for combining the elements in the
manner claimed." (quoting KSR, 550 U.S. at 420)).
25 See In re Wood, 599 F.2d at 1036 ("[W]e presume full knowledge by the inventor of
all the prior art in the field of his endeavor.").
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know everything within the scope of the prior art. 26 Thus, a determination
of obviousness is made by stepping into the shoes of this imaginary person
of ordinary skill in the art (but, apparently, with extraordinary research
skills).
VII.

DETERMINING WHETHER A REFERENCE IS WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THE

PRIOR ART

Many courts have visited this issue, frequently reciting two tests 27 to
determine whether a particular cited reference that potentially renders a
particular invention obvious is within the scope of the prior art. The first
test asks whether the reference is in the same field as the inventor's
endeavor. 2 8 The second test asks whether the reference is reasonably
29
pertinent to the particular problem with which the inventor was involved.
These two tests are frequently conflated, and thus the intersection between
the two is not always perfectly clear. 30 However, based on the description
that follows, it should be clear that it is necessary to ask both questions
because neither answer implies an answer to the other question. In other
words, if the answer to either question is yes, this is sufficient to say that
the reference is analogous and thus available for an obviousness rejection.
In this case, an argument that the invention is nonetheless non-obvious must
attack from a different angle (e.g., a different Graham factor).
VIII. THE FIELD OF ENDEAVOR
Determining the field of endeavor sounds simple enough, especially in
light of the USPTO recommended practice for inventors to include a
statement in a patent application identifying the field of the invention.31
26 See In re Nilssen, 851 F.2d 1401, 1403 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ("The board attributes to the
'hypothetical person' knowledge of all prior art in the field of the inventor's endeavor and of

prior art solutions for a common problem even if outside that field.").
27 See In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ("two separate tests"); In re
Clay, 966 F.2d 656, 658-59 (Fed. Cir. 1992) ("two criteria"); In re Wood, 599 F.2d at 1036
("two-fold test").
28 See In re Clay, 966 F.2d 656,at 659 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
29 See id.
30 See, e.g., In re Bigio, 381 F.3d at 1326 (stating that in rejecting a patent application

for a hair brush based on obviousness over certain toothbrushes, the Board "correctly set the
field of the invention by consulting the structure and function of the claimed invention as
perceived by one of ordinary skill in the art."). However, the quotation of the Board cited by
the Federal Circuit was not related to setting the field of the invention, but instead related to
the second question, by stating that "'one of ordinary skill in the art working in the specific
field of hairbrushes [would] consider all similar brushes including toothbrushes."' Id.
(quoting In re Bigio, No. 2002-0967, slip op. at 7 (B.P.A.I. Jan. 24, 2003).
31 See M.P.E.P.,supranote 15, § 601(1).
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However, a formal announcement that an invention is in a particular field is
not required, and has its disadvantages, and is thus frequently omitted from
a patent application or intentionally obscured.3 2 Thus, the field of endeavor
is not always clear and can be a point of contention in an obviousness
analysis, particularly if confronted by a patent examiner who defines the
field of endeavor as something as broad as, for example, "mechanics."
Unfortunately, the case law appears erratic on this issue at times with
some opinions, particularly those of the various circuit courts prior to the
establishment of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, finding an
exceptionally narrow field of endeavor 3 3 and others finding an
extraordinarily wide field. 34 Arguing this issue can easily appear to be
cherry picking of favorable opinions unless one makes a clear synthesis of
the case law stating a convincing rule. Of course, this situation may work in
an applicant or patentee's favor. An issue that is so apparently subjective
can allow an advocate some wiggle room in which a powerfully persuasive
argument can sway a fact finder even in a seemingly hopeless situation.
The field of endeavor is an objective test, and as such, a proper
characterization of the field of endeavor should be wholly independent of
the state of mind of the inventor. Specifically, one consideration to avoid in
determining the field of endeavor is the problem addressed by the
inventor.35 As will be discussed below, however, the problem the inventor
addressed is very relevant to the second test, asking whether a reference
would have been reasonably pertinent to that problem.
One straightforward and useful tool to determine the field of a patent

32 JEFFREY G. SHELDON, HOW TO WRITE A PATENT APPLICATION § 8:5.8[B] (2d ed. 2009)
("Identification of the 'field of the invention' can hurt the applicant. If the field of invention
is described very broadly, this can be interpreted to be an admission that anything within the
broad description is analogous art and can be used to reject the claims under 35 U.S.C. §
103. If the field of the invention is described unduly narrowly, then the scope of the claims
may be interpreted during litigation to be of commensurate narrow scope.").
33 See, e.g., Wang Labs., Inc. v. Toshiba Corp., 993 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (holding
valid a patent for a computer memory module having nine memory chips: eight for storing
data and one for error detection, mounted in a single row on an epoxy-glass printed circuit
board substrate, directed to personal computers, because a reference was outside the field of
endeavor when it disclosed a memory module having nine memory chips: eight for storing
data and one for error detection, mounted in a single row on an epoxy-glass printed circuit
board substrate, directed to industrial applications).
34 See, e.g., Stevenson v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 612 F.2d 546, 550 (C.C.P.A. 1979) ("In a
simple mechanical invention a broad spectrum of prior art must be explored and it is
reasonable to permit inquiry into other areas where one of ordinary skill in the art would be
aware that similar problems exist."); See Skee-Trainer, Inc. v. Garelick Mfg. Co,, 361 F.2d
895, 896 (8th Cir. 1966) (defining the field of endeavor as "the field of mechanics").
35 In re Clay, 966 F.2d 656, 658-59 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (defining the test as "whether the
art is from the same field of endeavor, regardless of the problem addressed.").
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application is the Patent Office classification system. After a new
application for a patent is filed, the USPTO classifies it into at least one of a
large number of very detailed classes and subclasses. 36 This classification
system was designed to assist patent examiners during their patentability
search.37 So it makes sense that courts consider the fact that a prior art
patent has been classified in the same or nearly the same class as the
invention as evidence that the two inventions are in the same field 38 and
far-departed classifications are considered evidence that the inventions are
39
not.
The USPTO Handbook of Classification provides a helpful discussion
of the bases on which it determines the classification of patent applications.
The classification is based on (1) the industry employing the art or use to
which the device is put; (2) the "proximate" function, or the fundamental
utility of the invention; 40 (3) the effect of or product produced by the
invention; and (4) the structure of the invention. 4 1 Although it does not
appear that the Federal Circuit has ever expressly followed these guidelines
in determining the field of endeavor, they are nonetheless very well thought
out and will provide a helpful basis on which to begin an analysis of the
field of endeavor.
In at least one precedential opinion, the evidentiary value of USPTO
classification toward a definition of the field of endeavor was characterized
as "weak" because "considerations in forming a classification system differ
from those relating to a person of ordinary skill seeking solution for a
particular problem." 42 However, the court did not explain what it believed
to be the considerations in forming the classification system, or what the
person having ordinary skill would look at in seeking such a solution.
Moreover, the argument appears inapposite, more properly directed to the
second test (discussed below, in which it is considered whether a prior art
reference outside the field of endeavor would nevertheless have been
reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the inventor was
concerned) rather than the question of what the field of endeavor is.
Therefore, the straightforward usefulness of the USPTO classification
36 See U.S. PATENT AND TRADE OFFICE, HANDBOOK OF CLASSIFICATION (2005), available
at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/opc/documents/handbook.pdf.

Id. at 1.
38 See In re Deminski, 796 F.2d 436, 442 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
39 See, e.g., In re Ellis, 476 F.2d 1370, 1372 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
40 "[S]imilar processes or structures that achieve similar results by the application of
similar natural laws to similar substances are considered to have the same fundamental
utility and are grouped together." HANDBOOK OF CLASSIFICATION, supra note 36, at 3.
41 Id. at 3-4.
37

42 In re Mlot-Fijalkowski, 676 F.2d 666, 670 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
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system should not be overlooked.
Of course, the Patent Office classification system is obviously not
helpful for an applicant or patentee who believes that the classification of
an application is wrong, and that an incorrect classification is a chief reason
that a reference is being improperly considered in an obviousness analysis.
In this situation, the differences in structure and function should be
emphasized.
The primary consideration that the USPTO uses during examination to
determine whether a reference is in the same field of endeavor as an
invention is if the reference discloses the same structure and function as the
invention. 43 The structure and function of the invention are broadly defined,
and are based on the complete disclosure of all the embodiments in the
patent's specification. 44 In general, if an allegedly prior art reference
discloses essentially the same structure and the same function as the
invention, it is very likely in the same field of endeavor; that is, the
reference is almost certainly within the scope of the prior art. 4 5 In
borderline cases such as when a reference discloses the same structure
explicitly limited to performing a different function, or if it discloses a
different structure performing the same function as the invention, there may
be a convincing argument that the reference is not in the same field of
endeavor.
However, these borderline cases may still sometimes be held to be
within the same field. For example, the Federal Circuit in In re Bigio held a
patent application for a hairbrush obvious over references disclosing
toothbrushes. 46 In dissent, Judge Newman made the common sense
argument that "[a] brush for hair has no more relation to a brush for teeth
than does hair resemble teeth," and that the references were therefore in a
non-analogous art. 47 However, the court agreed with the assessment of the
Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences ("BPAI") that the toothbrush
references were analogous, and used them to render the application
obvious.
First, the BPAI had held that structure was similar, a relatively simple
determination. 4 8 Second, the BPAI proposed an alternate function of the

43 See M.P.E.P.,supra note 15, § 2141.01(a)(11).
44 See, e.g., In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (The field of endeavor is
determined "by reference to explanations of the invention's subject matter in the patent
application, including the embodiments, function, and structure of the claimed invention.").
45 See In re Deminski, 796 F.2d 436, 442 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
46 381 F.3dat 1325.
47 Id. at 1327 (Newman, J., dissenting).

48 Id. at 1326.
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toothbrush, stating that the toothbrush "may easily be used for brushing hair
(e.g., human facial hair) in view of the size of the bristle segment and
arrangement of the bristle bundles described in the reference." 4 9 Thus, the
structure and function were similar enough, and the art was analogous. The
court agreed with the BPAI, holding that the 50references were in an
analogous art and rendered the application obvious.
In considering the field of endeavor, the simplicity or complexity of
the invention can respectively broaden or narrow the field of endeavor. For
example, if an invention is a simple mechanical device, then the fact finder
may believe that all fields that use such simple mechanical devices are
analogous. Consequently, the inventor is charged with all knowledge in this
sweeping field.5 1 On the other hand, more complex inventions such as
those requiring a high degree of specialization may result in a narrow field
52
of endeavor.
If other issues do not render the field of endeavor apparent, extrinsic
evidence of the scope of the field of endeavor may be useful. In this case,
extrinsic evidence refers to evidence from outside the specification itself.
The Federal Circuit in Bigio recently stated that any basis for limiting or
expanding the field of endeavor must come from the specification, leading
53
to a possible question of the admissibility of such evidence for this issue.
However, the same court has previously allowed expert testimony on this
point. 54 Expert testimony from one familiar with either the patent or a prior
art reference appears to be a logical choice to help determine whether the
reference is in the same field as the invention. Similarly, an affidavit by
such an individual would almost certainly help an applicant during patent
examination to establish that a cited reference is outside the applicant's
field of endeavor. Because expert testimony was not directly discussed in
Bigio, the dictum quoted above does not carry much weight, and extrinsic
evidence is very likely admissible on this point. Furthermore, because an
expert's testimony can win or lose a case on this point, 55 the better rule is to
49 Id. (quoting In re Bigio, No. 2002-0967, slip op. at 5 (B.P.A.I. Jan. 24, 2003).
50 Id.
51 See Stevenson v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 612 F.2d 546, 550 (C.C.P.A. 1979) ("In a
simple mechanical invention a broad spectrum of prior art must be explored and it is
reasonable to permit inquiry into other areas where one of ordinary skill in the art would be
aware that similar problems exist.").
52 See, e.g., Wang Labs., Inc. v. Toshiba Corp., 993 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
53 381 F.3d at 1326 ("The examiner and the Board must have a basis in the application
and its claimed invention for limiting or expanding the scope of the field of endeavor.").
54 See Union Carbide Corp. v. Am. Can Co., 724 F.2d 1567, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
55 E.g., SAB lndustri AB v. Bendix Corp., 199 U.S.P.Q. 95 (E.D. Va. 1978) (holding a
patent related to automotive brakes nonobvious, over reference related to railway brakes,
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allow its use to help determine whether a reference is in the same field. If
expert testimony is to be used during litigation, a foundation must be laid to
show that the purported expert has expertise as to the scope of the field.5 6
IX.

REASONABLE PERTINENCE TO THE PARTICULAR PROBLEM WITH WHICH
THE INVENTOR WAS INVOLVED

The second test used to determine whether a reference is within the
analogous art broadens the universe of prior art references. That is, even if a
reference is not in the same field of endeavor, it may still be considered
analogous if the reference would have been reasonably pertinent to the
particular problem with which the inventor was involved when the act of
inventing took place. 5 7 This test has four essential components, with the
first three being preliminary to the fourth, and main, part. The first part is
the characterization of the fictional person having ordinary skill in the art,
rather than characterizing the inventor him or herself. Second is stepping
back in time to when the act of inventing took place. Third is defining the
particular problem with which the inventor was involved. Fourth, and most
importantly, the "reasonable pertinence" standard requires determining
whether a reference logically would have commended itself to the
inventor's attention.
The first part may seem counterintuitive. In order to determine what
the inventor was doing or what the inventor should have looked at in an
analogous art test, one might guess that a fact finder should characterize
that inventor. However, even though courts may sometimes refer to or even
occasionally concentrate on the inventor, 5 8 the proper analysis does not

relate directly to the inventor. Instead, as told by § 103, the question relates
to the imaginary person having ordinary skill in the art, called the

PHOSITA.5 9
Similar to the ordinary and reasonable person of tort law, the

when the defendant's expert on automotive braking systems admitted he had no knowledge
of railway braking systems; pertinent art defined as limited to the brake art for automotive
vehicles, not the brake art, which would include railway brakes).
56 See Union Carbide Corp., 724 F.2d at 1572.
57 In re Clay, 966 F.2d 656, 659 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
58 See, e.g., Digitronics Corp. v. New York Racing Ass'n, 553 F.2d 740, 745 (2d Cir.
1977) (considering the training of the patentee in an effort to determine scope of prior art).
59 Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 810 F.2d 1561, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1987) ("To reach
a proper conclusion under § 103, the decision maker must step backward in time and into the
shoes worn by that 'person' [the PHOSITA] when the invention was unknown and just
before it was made ... [and then] determine whether the patent challenger has convincingly
established ... that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious at that time
to that person.") (emphasis in original).
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PHOSITA standard provides a more objective basis on which the fact
finder can determine the obviousness of an invention. 60 Because this skilled
person must be defined in any obviousness analysis, however, and defining
the PHOSITA is in fact its own Graham factor, 6 1 a detailed discussion is
not included here, and the level of skill is assumed to be known.
Once the PHOSITA has been determined, the fact finder must step
back in time and imagine being in that person's shoes at the time that the
inventor came up with the invention. This step is important in order to
avoid hindsight bias, where the disclosure of the invention itself is
improperly used as a kind of a roadmap to find prior art sources that might
render the invention obvious. 62 The thought processes of the inventor, or
any other events that occurred after the time of the application, must be
carefully avoided to reduce any potential for hindsight bias.
Obviously, to determine whether a reference is reasonably pertinent to
the particular problem with which the inventor was involved, one must
define that problem. Thus, the third part is to define the particular problem
that the inventor confronted by creating the invention. This question may be
answered explicitly in the specification, or it may be straightforward from
the nature of the invention. In other cases, a declaration or affidavit by the
inventor may be warranted.
The definition of the particular problem with which the inventor was
involved must be carefully performed, so as not to expand the scope of the
analysis to include other problems that might be solved by the disclosure of
the invention, but were not the actual problem (or problems) the inventor
was addressing. In KSR, the Federal Circuit does refer to those other
problems that the disclosure might solve; however, its statements on this
point are not related to the analogous art test. Rather, the court in KSR is
referring to the subsequent step in an obviousness analysis, which
determines whether one skilled in the art would have had a reason to
combine references. 63 The question of whether there was a reason to
combine the references is only resolved after those references have been
determined to be within an analogous art. In the analogous art analysis,

60 Id. (stating that the PHOSITA is "aghost ... not unlike the 'reasonable man' and other
ghosts in the law.").
61 See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966).
62 See In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1447 (Fed. Cir. 1992) ("The combination of
elements from non-analogous sources, in a manner that reconstructs the applicant's invention
only with the benefit of hindsight, is insufficient to present a prima facie case of
obviousness.").
63 KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 420 (2007) ("[A]ny need or problem
known in the field of endeavor at the time of invention and addressed by the patent can
provide a reason for combining the elements in the manner claimed.").
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however, those other problems are not relevant.
With these preliminary considerations settled, the heart of the
analogous art test is whether the reference logically would have
commended itself to the attention of the PHOSITA, if the PHOSITA were
trying to solve the problems the inventor was addressing. 64 Courts appear
flexible, frequently referring to common sense when answering this
question. 65 For example, if the arts are "manifestly far removed," like the
art of Japanese cutlery is from the art of rocket 66science, references in those
arts will typically be considered non-analogous.
Even if the pertinence of a reference is not quite so straightforward,
what might be called common sense still goes a long way. At the relevant
time, when confronted with the particular problem the inventor addressed,
one skilled in the art is likely to have looked at other references that
addressed the same problem. Thus, when confronted with a particular
reference, such as one provided by a patent examiner, it is important to
determine the problem the author of that reference was addressing. If the
purpose of the prior art reference is the same or similar to the purpose of the
application or patent, then it is more likely to be considered within an
67
analogous art.
More broadly, if practitioners in another field frequently confront very
similar problems as that problem addressed by the inventor, then one skilled
in the art should be expected to generally refer to references in that field. 68
Thus, essentially any reference within that field might be considered within
the analogous art. Clearly, understanding the relationship between the
problem the inventor confronted and the problem the author of the "prior
art" reference has great value.
In fact, even a seemingly obvious relationship between the art of the
invention and the purportedly analogous art is much less important than the

In re Clay, 966 F.2d 656, 659 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
See In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
66 See In re Van Wanderham, 378 F.2d 981, 988 (C.C.P.A. 1967); see also In re Clay,
966 F.2d at 658 (stating in dicta that art in too remote a field is non-analogous).
67 In re Clay, 966 F.2d at 659 ("[T]he purposes of both the invention and the prior art are
important in determining whether the reference is reasonably pertinent to the problem .... If
64
65

a reference disclosure has the same purpose as the claimed invention, the reference relates to
the same problem[.]").
68 See, e.g., Automatic Arc Welding Co. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 60 F.2d 740 (7th Cir.
1932) (holding that an electric arc lamp was in an analogous art to a patent for an electric arc
welder). "Obviously, the problem of the electrical engineer in the other fields was so similar,
and necessarily so, that one trained as an electrical engineer must be chargeable with the
knowledge common to those who labored in those fields.... Itseems to us that an electrical
engineer, or other worker skilled in this art, would naturally turn to other electrical fields
such as lighting and adopt the means there commonly used." Id. at 743-44.
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relationship between the problems confronted by those skilled in the
relevant arts. Thus, even arts that may appear to be very similar, such as
automotive brakes and railway brakes, may be non-analogous if it can be
shown that those skilled in the art of automotive braking systems have no
knowledge of the problems confronted while designing railway braking
systems.

69

One useful question is to ask whether the problem confronting the
inventor was a peculiar problem essentially confined to a particular field. If
the same problem confronting this inventor frequently occurs in other
70
fields, then references from those fields are more likely to be analogous.
Conversely, if the problem is unique to the inventor's field, then seemingly
similar references in other fields are probably not analogous.
Continuing with the "common sense" theme, and similar to the
previously mentioned test for whether a reference is within the same field,
reasonable pertinence might be decided based on similarities in structure
and function of the invention and the subject of the "prior art" reference.
Once again, the MPEP considers similarities and differences in structure
and the function very important and gives them top billing in its discussion
71
of the analogous art test.
Another way to prove whether a reference is in the analogous arts is to
ask an expert. The Federal Circuit has allowed expert testimony in an
infringement litigation to assist in the determination of whether a reference
should be considered.7 2 Thus, it stands to reason that during the application
process, the declaration of an expert should be considered as to whether a
field is analogous or not. In either case, though, the proponent of expert
testimony must lay a sufficient foundation to show that the purported expert
has expertise as to the scope of the field and/or what other fields are
analogous.
Once a reference is determined to be within an analogous art, the
inventor is charged with all the teachings of that reference, regardless of
what problem the reference was directed to. This rule might therefore be

69 See SAB Industri AB v. Bendix Corp., 199 U.S.P.Q. 95 (E.D. Va. 1978).
70 See In re Icon Health & Fitness, Inc., 496 F.3d 1374, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (affirming
the invalidation of a patent for a treadmill with a folding base over prior art teaching a bed
that folds up into a cabinet). "Nothing about Icon's folding mechanism requires any
particular focus on treadmills; it generally addresses problems of supporting the weight of

such a mechanism and providing a stable resting position." Id. See also In re Paulsen, 30
F.3d 1475 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (holding a patent application for a laptop computer having a
monitor that folds over the keyboard with hinges obvious over references such as hinged
cabinets, piano lids, etc., because the problem was not unique to its field).
71 See M.P.E.P., supra note 15, § 2141.01(a)(11).
72 See Union Carbide Corp. v. Am. Can Co., 724 F.2d 1567, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
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thought of as a threshold; if any part of the reference brings it within the
73
prior art, the reference is considered as a whole.
X. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

Although the two questions of whether a reference is within the same
field of endeavor, or whether one having ordinary skill in the art would
have considered the reference reasonably pertinent to the particular problem
with which the inventor was involved are the primary questions in the
determination of the analogous art, they do not end the inquiry. Even if the
answer to both questions is "no," a reference may nonetheless be available
for an obviousness analysis. For example, if the inventor admits to having
consulted a particular reference during the inventive process, then that
reference is available for consideration. 74 Similarly, if the inventor admits
that a particular reference is analogous in the specification or during
prosecution, then the inventor is precluded from later arguing that that
reference is non-analogous. 7 5 However, such admissions are not generally
made by merely citing references in an information disclosure statement
("IDS"); a binding admission that a reference is available as prior art is
76
generally made during prosecution.
While it may seem improper to consider a design patent to be within
an analogous art to a utility patent or application, or vice versa, this is not
the case. 7 7 Using the same analysis above, essentially any type of reference
can potentially be analogous and it does not matter if it is a design or a
utility patent. Similarly, method claims can be analogous to a patent or
application claiming an apparatus, as long as the method results in a

73 See W.L. Gore & Assocs. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (holding
that a prior art reference must be considered in its entirety).
74 Constant v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 848 F.2d 1560, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1988)
("[A]ny reference ... that was the source of ideas used by the inventor when he conceived
his invention is relevant and can be considered on the issue of obviousness.").
75 See, e.g., In re Schreiber, 128 F.3d 1473, 1479 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ("[W]e note that [the
inventor] Schreiber acknowledges in the specification that the prior art pertinent to his
invention [related to popcorn dispensing] includes patents relating to dispensing fluids.
Schreiber therefore may not now argue that such patents are non-analogous art.").
76 See, e.g., Abbott Labs. v. Baxter Pharm. Prods., Inc., 334 F.3d 1274, 1279 (Fed. Cir.
2003) ("[Mlere submission of an IDS to the USPTO does not constitute the patent
Under certain
applicant's admission that any reference in the IDS is material prior art ....
circumstances, even an express representation that a reference cited in an IDS is prior art to

pending claims is not sufficient to create prior art by admission.").
77 See In re Aslanian, 590 F.2d 911 (C.C.P.A. 1979) (holding a utility patent obvious
over a design patent, and further citing precedent that utility patents may be cited as prior art
to render a design patent obvious).
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product having a similar structure to the apparatus claimed. 78 For the same
reason, this would work the other way as well-a method claim could be
rendered obvious by an analogous art reference with only apparatus claims.
Xl. CONCLUSION

In the end, if a cited reference in an obviousness rejection is within the
prior art, a patent practitioner must enter the minefield of accurately
portraying the differences between the reference and the invention. Dangers
to the patentee are numerous, such as inadvertent admissions, the addition
of unneeded limitations on the claimed subject matter, or just plain wrong
statements. Thus, every patent attorney and agent needs a clear path
through the minefield, having as many tools as possible to eliminate a
potential prior art reference from being considered at all. In most cases, if
the reference qualifies under at least one part of 35 U.S.C. § 102, the
analogous art test can many times achieve this goal and vanish a reference.
The analogous test is actually two tests-whether a reference is in the same
art, and if not, whether its teachings would have been reasonably pertinent
to the particular problem with which the inventor was involved. If the
answer to both questions is no, then in most instances there is no need to
even set foot in the minefield because the reference is gone.

78 See Nat'l Filters, Inc. v. Research Prods. Corp., 384 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1967).

